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AN EMPIRICAL 
CONSIDERATION OF 
SUBSTANCE 
Richard .J. CONNELL 
R ECENTL y the publication of certain books and the appearance of journal 
articles on substance indicate that the topic is of lively interest. The interest, 
however, has not prevented the disparities in the way the topic is treated l'rom 
suggesting that the discussion might not be properly focused. Aristotle was the first 
to articulate a precise notion of substance, and his views dominated philosophy 
until the modern era, at which time they were summarily removed from the arena 
by David Hume's attack on them. Since that day substance has been a sort of 
persona non grata, at least in Anglo-American philosophy, few philosophers having 
found the notion advantageous to their enterprises. 
But though substance has returned as an arguable philosophie issue, the Clif-
rent discussions seem to miss the central point. As Hume alleged, Aristotle did 
indeed view substance as a substratum in which accidents - or modes, as Hume 
preferred to cali them - reside. His attack was directed squarely at that point. But 
from what 1 can see, the current essays do not grasp what Aristotle held, so they 
also fail to see the f1aw in Hume's attack. Hence 1 wish to declare at the outset that 
1 consider Aristotle to have spoken correctly when he said that realities are of two 
kinds, substance and accident. My aim will be, then, to present the notion of subs-
tance as a substratum and to defend it against Hume's attack. Let me stress, 
however, that 1 do not intend to write an historical essay on what Aristotle held, 
for what he held is of much less significance than whether what he he Id is right or 
wrong, true or false. And so although the view 1 shall defend seems to me to be 
Aristotle's, that is a minor matter, and 1 shaH direct my efforts towards presenting 
an empirical account of the notion of substance. To do so 1 must ask the reader to 
grant that in sorne measure we can know the world "out there"; if he does, 1 think 
1 can make my case with him. 
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A) Beginnings in ordinary experience 
As signs of things, words provide the mind with a shortcut to reality. They are 
the mind's own tool for noting similarities and distinctions, and they provide it 
with a handy starting point for reflective analyses of notions that are already 
present to it in a non-reflective, non-analytic way. As the analytic philosophers 
have been at pains to tell us, a good look at the meaning and uses of words is a 
fruitful way to begin philosophical considerations. 
With that in mind one might do weil to note that the words of ordinary 
language tell us the world con tains a great many "things" that are made of "stuff'. 
1 t also tells us that both things and stuff have numerous "properties", and that 
without undergoing modifications in themselves, things and stuffs are subject to 
many changes in their states, conditions, appearances, traits, properties. But though 
language is made for drawing the mind's attention to similarities and distinctions, 
differences in language do not necessarily entail differences in the realities they 
signify, since different modes of speaking can, as everyone knows, be corre1ated 
with the same reality. Nevertheless in a concrete case when the modes of speaking 
are different the realities are probably different too. Consequently if language 
signifies that both things and stuff remain while their conditions, states, etc., chan-
ge, then the probability that they are different obliges one to examine them and 
ask: what is a thing? a stuff? what sort of a reality is a property? are there real 
differences that correspond to these verbal differences? or ought the language to be 
corrected so as to remove the source of what is actually an illusion? Whatever 
position one ultimately takes on these issues, whether he maintains that the realities 
are different or whether he maintains that the language ought to be corrected, the 
problem is clearly centered on the realities themselves; for in order to judge that a 
mode of speaking is illusory, one first has to know the character of what is signi-
fied. On those grounds, then, 1 shall approach the issue of substance by using the 
mode of speaking 'as a starting point. 
First let me note that words such as "thing" and "stuff' and "condition" and 
"state" and "appearance" and "property" do not, in ordinary speech, refer to 
fictions; they ail refer to something in the actual world "out there". On that 
account they can, in a negative way, be said to have something in corn mon insofar 
as they do not signify fictions and do signify realities; so one may appropriately 
note that the real is that which exists outside the mind. Few readers, 1 dare to 
anticipate, will deny that this is an accurate account of the most general sense of 
the word. (The phrase, "outside the mind", merely emphasizes what "exists" means 
and do es not add to the content of its sense.) Yet the primary issue is not what su ch 
words have in common in their significations, but how they differ. 
If we start with the words "thing" and "stuff', we see that the first of the two 
words signifies a readily distinguished individual, such as an animal or plant, 
individuals which are obviously units possessing the character of independent who-
les. "Stuff', on the other hand, signifies realities su ch as water, iron, salt, etc., in 
which individuals, even when they exist, are not so easily detected. But we do speak 
236 
AN EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATION OF SUBSTANCE 
of "grains of salt", "pieces of iron", and "drops of water", although none of these 
has the readily determined, easily recognized individual independence of organisms. 
A "grain" or "drop" or "crystal" or "mo\ecule" or "atom" is always a grain or 
drop or atom "of something". Each of these words signifies a part of a whole, an 
"amount" that is less clearly an individual than an organism. Despite these 
distinctions, however, the point will be made a bit later that things and stuff are 
more alike th an different. 
In contrast to "thing" and "stuff', words such as "property", "condition", 
"state", "appearance", and the like do not first of ail suggest individuals to the 
mind; rather, they suggest realities that are assigned ta or predicated of things and 
stuffs. We say "The elephant is gray", or "The elephant is large", predicating the 
gray and large of elephant; but we do not say, "The large or gray is elephant", 
except when we understand thing ta accompany large or gray as in "large thing" or 
"gray thing". Furthermore, we do not admit that shape is a stuff, that color is a 
stuff, that viscosity is a stuff, that conductivity is a stuff, that hardness is Il stuff, 
etc. Whatever its nature or character, stuff cannot be predicated of such properties. 
Now differences in modes of speaking sueh as these allow us ta infer with probabi-
lit y that they depend upon differences in realities; sa we must tum our attention 
directly to the latter. 
Observations of natural objects often reveal that variations in sorne traits of 
objects occur while something el se which accompanies the traits remains untou-
ched. When an animal, or any other body for that matter, moves from one place to 
another, its location varies without its other attributes changing. In like manner, a 
lump of clay can undergo a change of shape without at the same time undergoing 
changes in other properties too. Again, wh en water tums ta ice we ho Id the former 
to differ from the latter not as a kind of stuff but only in its superficial attributes. 
The point is that in ail these examples a modification in one reality occurs while 
something else - whatever it may be - remains unmodified~ But more important-
Iy, after the changes have been completed in the animal and the clay there is 
"more" identity left, so to speak, than there is difference that has been introduced. 
If we look at ourselves, we confront the most obvious case in which something 
varies while something e\se remains. As many have noted before me, men stay the 
same in ail important attributes wh en they go from here ta there, when they change 
their position from sitting to standing, or even when they grow from being a child 
to an adult. Apropos of these cases we signify the differences in the realities by 
saying that men, animais, and ail otger things and stuffs, remain what they are as 
things or stuffs, while undergoing a number of superficial modifications. (Of course 
we do recognize modifications that affect the things or stuff, for example, chemical 
reactions, as weil as the production and death of organisms. These, however, are 
not the issue al the moment.) And so employing a language that does not prejudge 
the issue, if observation shows that in ail these changes "much" is unmodified 
while a "Iittle" is varied, then what can one say about the nature of the "much" 
and the "Iittle"? What does such simultaneous variation and identity imply? 
A weil known philosopher of science has suggested how we are to view the 
difference between the "Iittle" and the "much": 
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Operationalism ... fails to impart meaning to substantive concepts - that is, 
concepts related to entities that are regarded as the carriers of operationally 
determinable qualities or quantities. To illustrate this latter point: it is possible 
to define, in terms of instrumental procedures, the charge, the mass, and the 
spin of an electron, but hardly the electron itself 1. 
Here Margenau distinguishes two sorts of realities, qualities and quantities on one 
hand, and their "carriers" on the other. We can, he says, define the former opera-
tionally, through instrumental procedures, but we cannot define "the electron it-
self' in that fashion. And when we ask ourselves how the carrier and what it 
carries are to be compared to one another, how the charge, the spin, etc., are to be 
compared 10 the electron itself, we are asking the basic question that seeks to know 
how they differ as realities. What Margenau describes in relation to the submicros-
copie can, however, be more easily considered in relation to the macroscopic. 
Upon focusing on a simple example - for instance, a piece of clay that is 
molded so as to change its shape - reflection will show that several realities are 
present. We see a varying shape and also a color, texture, mass, and many other 
attributes that do not vary; and hence the principle of non-contradiction requires 
that the shape be distinguished from them. Yet if one focuses his attention more 
closely on the shape, he sees that it al ways exists or occurs in conjunction with 
something else; he will recognize that shape is rather obviously a mode, a limit, a 
boundary where something else - that which is signified by "clay" - leaves off; 
and this is true whether clay be a reality distinct from the attributes assigned to it, 
or whether it be one or several of those attributes. Hence because shape is a 
boundary, a mode, a modification of something else, wh ether "something else" 
signifies an observable attribute or an unobservable substratum underlying the 
attribute, shape can have no separate existence. 
And if once again we renect on ourselves, we readily see that our shape is our 
boundary, that our shape is truly the limit where we leave off; and as Margenau 
would say, that we' are the carriers of our shapes. Beyond any doubt shape is a 
reality, and beyond any doubt it is a reality that exists in something other th an 
itself. Shape, then (and many other properties as weil), exists, as Aristotle noted, in 
another as in a subject; and insofar as shape exists in another it is dependent on 
that other. We ought to note, moreover, that the phrase "as in a subject" is not a 
useless part of this formula, for it indicates the meaning of "in" which is appro-
priate here. One thing can be in another in many ways: as a hat is in a closet, as an 
effect is in a cause, as a cause is in an effect, as a part is in a whole, etc. And so 
what the defining formula makes plain is that shape exists in another as in a 
carrier, as Margenau says, or as in a subject or substratum as Aristotle said. 
The magnitude or size of something illustrates the same definition; for the size 
of what is called a "thing" or "stuff' can differ without the thing or stuff differing, 
and it never occurs or exists except in one or the other of them. Just as shape is in 
1. Henry MARGI'NAC, «Interpretations and Misinterpretations of Operationalism ", in The Validation 
of Scienti!ic Theories (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1956), p. 39. 
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something else as in a subject, so size too is in something else as in a subject. To be 
a little more precise, shape limits something el se insofar as it limits the magnitude 
or size of something else. 
Up to this point our considerations have borne upon shape and size as particu-
lar instances of a general kind of reality that modifies something else insofar as it 
resides in the something else. This kind of reality the medievals called an accidens, 
which is usually translated into English as "accident". (ln this context "accident" 
obviously does not have the meaning of "incidental" or "contingent", although 
sorne accidents belong contingently to things. Nor does it mean "fortuitous" or "by 
chance.") Many different modifiers or accidents reside in things, including rela-
tions, position, location, qualities such as viscosity, elasticity, etc., and no attempt 
will be made here to Iist them ail. But having touched on their general character, 
what does one then say about their carrier, about the something else in which they 
must exist as their subject or substratum? 
If shape is a reality which exists in another as in a subject, then quite naturally 
questions must arise about the subject itself. Does it, too, exist in something else as 
in a subject? and if so, does this second subject require another ad infinitum? The 
absurdity here is patent, however, for a process ad infinitum is not possible, from 
which one may infer that samething must exist that does not require a subject in 
which to exist. Such a reality Aristotle called "substance", defining it as that which 
exists in itself (or by itself) and nat in anather as in a subject. That the definition 
truly describes things and stuffs bears emphasizing, for clearly they do not exist in 
subjects. For example, water does not exist in another as in a subject, eJectrons (if 
they occur as they are conceived) do not exist in another as in a subject, men and 
other organisms do not exist in another as in a subject, etc. 
As the reader can see from the definitions above, the notion of a modifying 
trait and the notion of substance are understood simultaneously and in relation to 
one another, which is ta say that the definition of one depends upon understanding 
the other. Of the two, substance is "more" a reality than the modifying traits that 
exist in it. Now at this point the character of the "little" and the "much" should be 
plain; still, 1 would like to repeat for the sake of emphasis that the ordinary 
materials we cali stuffs, as weil as the things made from them, either are or contain 
something that does not exist in another as in a subject; that is ta say, either they 
are or they contain a substance or substances. The realities we signify by "eJe-
phant", "chipmunk", "iron", "copper", etc., c1early fit such a description. (Can-
taining a substance is given as an alternative to being a substance because in that 
way whether an organism, for instance, is a substance or whether it is a collection 
of substances is an issue that is left unprejudiced and open to further inquiry.) 
Applying the definition to some of the objects of our considerations, we can 
see that anything which truly has the character of an element or elementary body 
will be a substance. This also applies to photons; for however amorphous and 
"intangible" they rnay be in sorne respects, if they exist as they are conceived. then 
photons do not exist in another as in a subject. On the contrary, they are conceived 
as existing by themselves; they are thought ta be packets of energy-stuff. Once 
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again, howevermuch an e1ementary body of any sort may be conceived to exist in a 
place or in sorne whole, etc., it certainly is not conceived as existing in a subject. 
What is true of the microscopie is even more evidently tr.ue of the macroscopic, for 
we ourselves are easily recognized as instances of the general notion. 
So having outlined what substance is, we are in a position to note that its 
empirically obtained definition does not imply either an unqualified permanence or 
an unqualified independence. Substance is permanent in relation ta the physical 
changes (as the physicist calls them) of shape and color and temperature and viscosi-
ty, etc. {hat occur in il, but the definition of substance does not imply that it is 
permanent in an absolute sense. His idealism aside, Kant is not justified, therefore, 
in arguing that the permanent as such is the substratum; for wh ether permanent or 
impermanent a subject can be a substratum 2. 1 might add that Bertrand Russell 
also thinks of substance according to an a priori conception the essence of which is 
permanence J. Similarly, a substance is independent of a subject in its existence, but 
an independence of that kind is in no way absolute ; substance is not independent in 
the sense that it is uncaused and needs nothing e1se to exist (and is therefore God) 
as Descartes, for example, wou Id have it. Thus, assuming the impossible, were 
permanence and independence to be predicated of substance in an unqualified way, 
these attributes would have to be proved of it through an argument starting from 
something more th an the definiton that has been given. On that account criticisms 
which attack the Aristotelian notion of substance on the grounds of absolute 
permanence and absolute independence are altogether unwarranted and stem from 
a misconception. 
Another misconception that gives rise to many problems about natural entities 
has to do .with the simple and composed. The definition of substance in no way 
implies that substance is simple rather th an composed. We do, however, tend to 
assume that it has to be simple, an error well illustrated in Leibnit' Monadology: 
1. The Monado' of which we will speak here, is nothing else than a simple 
substance, which goes to make up composites; by simple, we mean without 
parts. 
2. There must be simple substances because there are composites; for a com-
posite is nothing else than a collection or aggregatum of simple substances 4. 
Leibniz actually begs the question in his argument, but the sa me unwarranted 
assumption about the simplicity of substance is made by a contemporary author: 
A "living" substance has often been spoken of. This concept is due to a 
fundamental fallacy. There is no "living substance" in the sense that lead, 
2 Critique of Pure Reason, tTans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan & Co. Lld., 1956), 
pp. 212 ff., also p. 229. 
3. Our Knowtedge of the Externat Wortd, A Mentor Book (New York: The New American Library of 
World Literature, Inc., 1960), lecture IV, 
4. LEIBNIZ, trans. George R. Montgomery (LaSalle, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Company, 
1962), p. 251. 
240 
A"i EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATION OF SUBSTAMT 
water, or cellulose are substances, where any arbitrarily taken part shows the 
same properties as the rest. Rather is life bound to individualized and orga-
nized systems, the destruction of which puts an end to it '. 
Let me repeat, the assumption that a substance must be simple is not warrantcd by 
the definition, a definition that is empirically obtained in relation to accident, and 
so the passages quoted above beg a question that no Aristotelian would concede. 
Such an error suggests that imagination has interferred with understancling 6 
According to yet another misconception the first problem of substance is the 
problem of individuation, and one has to concede that according to the notion 
presented singulars are substances in the fullest sense of the word. Yet one can 
hardly deny that singulars may be considered according to that which they have in 
common, and that which they have in corn mon is their character of existing in 
themselves and not in another as in a subject. On that account the problem of 
individuation is posterior to the problem of substance, and one can investigate it 
only when he knows what substances considered commonly are. Though 1 would 
agree that time and position (in the sense of location) are the identifying marks of 
individual substances, 1 would not agree that pos;tion is substance, a view he Id by 
Anthony Quinton 7. Position requires a subject in order to exist; it is always assi-
gned to something else and cannot exist in or by itself. 
Although the considerations that have been made up to now are incomplete 
and will be supplemented by others to follow, sorne remarks Anthony Quinton 
makes may be usefully noted, for they show that from the very beginning he leaves 
behind everything that belongs to the Aristoteiian consideration of substance, and 
so in a way he is representative of many contemporary philosophers: 
Substance is the oldest topic of philosophie inquiry and it is also one of the 
most entangled. The Ionian philosophers are generally recognized to have 
inaugurated western philosophy by asking the question: what is the ultimate 
stuff or raw mate rial of the world? Substance is the central theme of the first 
and most influential of philosophical text-books, Aristotle's Metaphysics. 
From that time to this every major philosopher has occupied himself with the 
problem of which of the many kinds of things the world appears to contain 
really or fundamentally exists. ln the course of this devclopment a number of 
disparate issues have to be brought together under one head. 1 sha11 argue that 
there are four quite distinct, even if not wholly independent, problems of 
substance whose solution has been obstructed by persistent failure to recognizc 
the distinctions between them. This confusion has been assisted by the fact that 
three of the problems of substance, at any rate, are of much the same general 
form. In each case the idea of substance is invoked to explain how things in 
general or sorne large and important class of things, admitted to be complexes 
of elements of sorne kind, are unified as wholes. Positive theories of substance 
explain the unification of these complexes by their connection with a special 
5. Ludwig Vos Br.RTALANIFY, Prob/ems of Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1(52). p. 13. 
6. LEIBNIZ, like many others, has gone about philosophizing in an a priori fashion, failing 10 kee[1 in 
mind that one's definitions have to account for what he observes. 
7. Anthony QUINTOt-<, The na/ure of Things (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan l'aul. 1(73) 
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additional unifying eIement. The negative theories that reject substance hold 
that there is no more to the complexes in question than the collection of 
elements of which they are composed 8. 
Quinton first notes that the Ionians posed the problem of substance by asking 
about the "ultimate stuff or raw mate rial of the world", and from there he moves 
on to another question about "which of the many kinds of things the world 
appears to contain really or fundamentally exists". Yet nowhere does he define 
either slUff or fundamental existence, leaving his essay bereft of a genuine princip le 
of manifestation. (This sort of omisssion is rather common.) Then after his intro-
duction he goes on to state that there are four separate problems of substance: 
individuation, identity, objectivity, and the foundations of knowledge, ail of which 
he introduces without relating them either to the Ionian stuff that he says first 
introduces the problem of substance into philosophy or to things that fundamen-
tally exist. One is left to wonder how the Ionians.' and Quinton's views can go 
together. 
We may note, however, that Quinton categorizes theories of substance as 
either positive or negative, a division that is useful. Positive theories "explain the 
unification of complexes by their connection with a special unifying element", a 
phrase in which one might possibly find something that is distantly similar to the 
Aristotelian carrier or substratum. On the other hand, the negative theories hold 
that "there is no more to the complexes in question than the collection of elements 
of which they are composed", (the bundle theories) a statement directly opposed to 
the Aristotelian notion and one that leads us to David Hume. He is the first to 
have substituted the notion of a collection of qualities for a substance modified by 
properties residing in it. On that account examining without delay what Hume said 
seems advisable. 
B) Hume's attack on substance 
Hume denounced in his Treatise the whole notion of substance, and he did so 
without blush or apology: 
... We have, therefore, no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collectifln 
of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or 
reason concerning it. 
The idea of a substance as weil as that of a mode, is nothing but a collection of 
simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name 
assigned them, by which we are able to recall, either to ourselves or others, 
that collection. But the difference betwixt these ideas consists in this, that the 
particular qualities, which form a substance, are commonly referr'd to an 
unknown something, in which they are supposed to inhere; or granting this 
fiction should not take place, are at least supposed to be closeIy and insepara-
tely connected by the relations of contiguity and causation 9. 
8. Ibid., p. 3. 
9. David HUME, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1975), 
p. 16. Hume makes these points in other places of the Treatise too, but this is a clear statement of 
his position and it suffices. 
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Having heard what he thinks about substance, we ought to hear what he thinks 
about modifiers or accidents: 
The notion of accidents is an unavoidable consequence of this method of 
thinking with regard to substances or substantial forms; nor can we forbear 
looking upon colours, sounds, tastes, figures, and other properties of bodies, 
as existences, which cannot subsist apart, but require a subject of inhesion to 
sustain and support them. For having never discover'd any of these sensible 
qualities, where, for the reasons above mention'd, we did not likewise fancy a 
substance to exist; the same habit, which makes us infer a connection betwixt 
cause and effect, makes us here infer a dependence of every quality on the 
unknown substance. The custom of imagining a dependence has the same 
effect as the custom of observing it would have. This conceit however, is no 
more reasonable than any of the foregoing. Every quality being a distinct thing 
from another, may be conceiv'd to exist apart, and may exist apart not only 
from every other quality, but from that unintelligible chimera of a substance 10. 
The first of these quotations tells us we have no idea of substance, and so we are 
foolish to think it exists. Of course experience does show us certain qualities, yet 
substance, because it is thought to underlie the qualities, must remain beyond the 
reach of experience, which means that no one committed to an empirical philoso-
phical position can have any truck with il. The second quotation then asserts that 
because modifiers (accidents) are distinct they can exist apart from a substratum; 
so plainly he opposes everything the foregoing pages contain. 
As one might expect, Hume's doctrine of personal identity reflects his denial of 
substance. He notes that sorne philosophers (not to mention the plain man) think 
(imagine, he says) they have an ide a of self, and to this he sets himself in opposition 
on the ground that 
... It must be sorne one impression that gives rise to every real idea. But self or 
person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions 
and ideas are supposed to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the 
idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, thro' the whole 
course of our lives; since self is suppos'd to exist after that manner. But there 
is no impression constant and invariable ... 
But farther, what must become of ail our particular perceptions upon this 
hypothesis? Ali these are different, and distinguishable, and separable from 
each other, and may be separately consider'd, and may exist separately, and 
have no need of anything to support their existence Il. 
Hume attacks the self as an individual substance, finding it as unacceptable as the 
general notion of substance. Thus it is clear that Hume provides the prototype of 
the «negative theories of substance." as Quinton calls them. Without fear of 
contradiction one may say that contemporary anti-substance philosophies ail de-
pend upon Hume's denials. 
One contemporary proponent of a negative theory clearly shares Hume's view : 
10. Ibid., p. 222. 
Il. Ibid., p. 251. 
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... If the substantive ego is not revealed in self-consciousness, it is not revealed 
anywhere. The existence of such an entity is completely unverifiable. And 
accordingly, we must conclude that the assumption of its existence is no less 
metaphysical than Locke's discredited assumption of the existence of a mate-
rial substratum. For it is clearly no more significant to assert that an "un-
observable somewhat" underlies the sensations which are the sole empirical 
manifestations of a material thing. The considerations which make it neces-
sary, as Berkeley saw, to give a phenomenalist account of material things, 
make it necessary also, as Berkeley did not see, to give a phenomenalist 
account of the self 12. 
Ayer, tao, regards the existence of a substantive ego as unverifiable, first 
because it is not revealed in self-consciousness; second because there is no point in 
assuming an «unobservable somewhat» to underly sensations. But one might ask 
on what grounds the claim is made that if substance is to be revealed it must be 
revealed in self-consciousness (whatever Ayer might me an by that), for none are 
stated. Nonetheless his objections (which come from Hume) do raise a point, for if 
substance or substances are not revealed either in sensory experience or in the 
consciousness of self, then we must ask, how are they known? In addition to the 
common, generic definition defended earlier and applicable to any substance what-
soever, if anything further is to be known about substance, if there are species 
under the general category, then how are they to be known, especially if substance 
is unobservable? But this problem can be postponed, for it is not the immediate 
issue. The matter at hand is to reinforce the general definition in the face of 
Hume's attack; consequently if someone thinks the distinctions and definitions 
presented earlier that were founded on experience are insufficiently supported, then 
perhaps he will be convinced by an argument which shows that sorne substance 
must exist (however we know it) and which starts from the position Hume himself 
takes. 
Let it be supposed that Hume is right: no substratum underlies the qualities 
we observe. And let it also be supposed that the qualities are real and do exist 
outside the knower, for we cannot forget our realist presupposition. From these 
premisses it th en follows that the qualities Cannot be modifiers, they cannot be 
accidents according to the Aristotelian notion; for modifiers exist in another as in a 
subject. If, however, the qualities do exist, and if they do not exist in a substra-
tum, as Hume daims, then they must exist independently of a subject; for there is 
no third alternative. Hume actually takes the position that the qualities exist but 
not in another as in a subject. To do that, however, is to endorse the definition of 
substance, from which one may condude that Hume's qualities must now be regar-
ded as substances in the Aristotelian sense. What it ail cornes to is that Hume has 
denied the reality of Aristotle's accidents by turning them into substances, and he 
explicitly concedes what has just been daimed when he says: "Every quality being 
12. A. J. AnR, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, Inc.) p. 126. Roderick 
Chisholm recognizes that the notion of self must make use of substance, and he denies Hume on 
this point. (See "On the Observability of the Self", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
Vol. XXX (1969), pp. 7-21.) He does not, however, destroy the Scot's position, as 1 shall attempt 
to do in the pages that follow. 
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a distinct thing from another, may be conceived to exist apart, and may exist apart 
not only from every other quality, but from that un intelligible chimera of a subs-
tance." What could be c\earer? Qualities may be conceived to exist apart. And 50 
Hume would appear not to realize what he has done. By failing ta pay careful 
attention to the definition of substance, he has suported it in a backhanded way. 
We may also say that from Hume's position certain consequences follow 
which show still more emphatically that he cannot succeed with his denial 01 
accidents. For if "substances" are collections of qualities (as they must be in ail 
negative theories), and if qualities have become substances, then things and stuffs 
are collections of qualities-become-substances. An elephant, therefore, would be an 
aggregate made up of a shape that is a substance, a color that is a substance, a 
motion that is a substance, a density that is a substance, a viscosity that is a 
substance, a size that is a substance, etc., all gathered together like marbles in a 
heap. But one can easily see that su ch a notion is false, for whatever an elephant 
may be, it is surely not an aggregate of that type. 
As a second illustration let us suppose that the shape and the motion of a 
billiard ball are qualities-become-substances. From this supposition it then follows 
that the motion of the ball must be distinct and separate from the shape and that 
the motion must be united to the shape exteriorly; that is, the motion must be 
united to the shape in the way in which an arm is joined ta its body and one freight 
car ta another; for the only other alternative, which is absurd, is to conceive 
substances as interpenetrating one another. (Assuming the latter, no two qualities 
which are interpenetrating substances could be distinguished from one another; 
they would be identical, or at least whatever differences they had would not be 
distinguishable.) On the other hand, if the motion is exterior to the shape, then 
what happens when the "bail" moves? Does the motion pull the shape along like 
an appendage? If sa, then the shape moves too, and there is not one motion but 
two, which means that the number of motions in the "ball" will be equal to the 
number of qualities-become-substances in the collection. Moreover, every motion 
but the first will reside in other traits and will be accidents or modifiers of the 
traits. But if the motion does not pull the shape along, then shape and motion must 
become constantly more separated, and the "ball" could hardly be said to move. 
Now the absurdity of both of these alternatives is obvious, yet both follow necessa-
rily from the supposition that the apprehended qualities do not inhere in a subject 
and are independent entities. In contrast, given bath shape and motion as modifiers 
of a substratum, no difficulty arises; for only one motion exists and it belongs to 
the ball which is its carrier. The other qualities "ride along" with the motion 
because they reside in Margenau's carrier-substratum, the proper subject or receiver 
of the motion. The upshot of all this is that the reality of substance cannot be 
denied un der any circumstances. Hume succeeds only in destroying accidents by 
making them into substances, and this final state of affairs is worse for him than 
the first. 
This finishes what needs to be said about the fundamentaJ notion and Hume's 
attack on il. As 1 remarked in the beginning, the reader is now able to see how to 
deal with other anti-substance philosophies, particularly those of the process type, 
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which like Hume den y the necessity of a substratum. Motion or process or "creati-
vity" or something similar is considered to be fundamental and to stand in no need 
of a substratum. Process then becomes substance, with ail the consequences that 
entails. 
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